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Chute: Constitutional Law - Commerce Clause Standards for State Taxation

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Commerce Clause Standards for State Taxation of
Mineral Severance: Commonwealth Edison, et al. v. State of Montana, et
al.,

__

U.S.

.,101 S.Ct. 2946 (1981).

The State of Montana taxes the severance of coal up to a
maximum of approximately 30% of the contract sales price,1
depending on BTU content. Most of the coal mined in Montana-an estimated 90%-is shipped out of state, usually under
long-term contracts which provide that the cost of taxes will be
passed along to the utilities who buy the coal. The utilities, in
turn, generally pass the increased price along to their electrici2
ty customers.
Four Montana coal producers and eleven of their out-ofstate utility customers filed suit against the state in Montana
district court claiming that the severance tax is invalid under
the Commerce3 and Supremacy Clauses 4 and seeking a refund
of severance taxes already paid and an injunction against continued collection of the tax. The district court, without taking
evidence in support of either side, granted the state's motion
to dismiss for failure to state claims upon which relief could be
granted. The Montana Supreme Court upheld the trial court's
dismissal. 5
On direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United
States, the Appellants proposed to show at trial6 that the 30%
severance tax constitutes a prohibited burden on interstate
commerce; that the tax substantially frustrates national
energy policies in violation of the Supremacy Clause; and that
the tax disturbs the allocation of tax revenues mandated by the
Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920,7 as amended by the
Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1975.8
The Supreme Court upheld the tax in its current amount,
holding that an evenhanded tax on the severance of minerals
Copyright© 1982 by the University of Wyoming.

1. MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. S 15-34-101 (1979). "Contract sales price" is defined as the
the mine, less the amount
price of the coal extracted and prepared for shipment f.o.b.
charged by the seller to pay taxes on production. MoNT.REV. CODES ANN. S15-35-102(1)
(1979).
2. Brief of Appellants at 8, Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, __

U.S.

-,

101 S.

Ct. 2946 (1981).
3. "Congress shall have Power ...To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes..." U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl.3.
4. The "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land..." U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl.2.
5. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, __

Mont.

.,615 P.2d 847 (1980).

6. Brief of Appellants, supra note 2, at 14-16.
7. 30 U.S.C. SS181-287 (1976).
8. Pub. L. No. 94-377, 90 Stat. 1083 (1975).
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could be constitutionally imposed by the state in which mining
occurred in the absence of specific Congressional action
limiting such taxes. This note will discuss the Supreme Court's
decision on the Appellants' Commerce Clause challenge and its
implications for the future of mineral severance taxes.
STATE TAXATION AND REGULATION OF INTERSTATE
COMMERCE BEFORE Commonwealth Edison v. Montana

The Supreme Court's modern analysis of state authority to
levy taxes which affect interstate commerce differs from its
analysis of state authority to regulate interstate commerce. In
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 9 the Court articulated the test it
has since used to determine when a state regulation which affects interstate commerce will be sustained:
Where a state regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on interstate commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. .

.

. [T]he extent of the burden that will be

tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local
interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted
as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.10
The Court's analysis of state taxes which affect interstate
commerce has evoked "dismay and frustration"" because of
12
its inconsistency. Until Complete Auto Transit,Inc. v. Brady
was decided in 1977, the Court used at least three distinct tests
to determine the constitutionality of state taxing measures.
After Complete Auto, and until the recent decision in Commonwealth Edison v. Montana,Is there were still arguably two
different tests.
The three separate groups of decisions on state taxes
before Complete Auto are perhaps best represented by the
cases of Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 1 4 Western Live
9. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).

10. Id. at 142. See also Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 331 (1979); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 445 U.S.
* 949 (1981).
11. Comment, ConstitutionalLimitations on State Severance Taxes, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J.
887. 898 (1980).
12. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
13. __

U.S.

"_ , 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981).

14. 260 U.S. 245 (1922).
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Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 15 and Spector Motor Service v.
16
O'Connor.
In Heisler and the later cases adopting its reasoning, 1 7 the
Court heard challenges to state taxes on the value of natural
resources produced within the state. The Court adopted a
rather formalistic approach' 8 and upheld taxes similar to the
Montana severance tax on the grounds that a facially nondiscriminatory tax which fell on resources prior to their entry
into the stream of commerce was beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause, even though the bulk of them were ultimately
shipped out of state. 19 The Court continued to cite this line of
cases with approval in tax cases until as late as 1961,20 even
though the earlier rigid distinction between local and interstate activities had long since lost its force. 21
In Western Live Stock the Court upheld a New Mexico
statute which levied a 2% privilege tax on the gross advertising revenues of a magazine published in the state even though
some of the revenues came from contracts entered into in
other states and the magazines were ultimately distributed in
interstate commerce. Anticipating the rationale of Complete
Auto, the Court noted that "it was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce
from their just share of state tax burden even though it increased the cost of doing business. 'Even interstate business
must pay its way.' "22
In Western Live Stock the Court held that the New Mexico
tax was constitutional because the magazine was not subjected
to multiple taxation: the New Mexico tax could not be repeated
by any other state. 23 The tax, based on a percentage of advertising receipts, also seemed to fairly measure the value of the
24
privilege of doing business in New Mexico.
15. 303 U.s. 250 (1938).
16. 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
17. Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923); Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274
U.S. 284 (1927).
18. Hellerstein, Constitutional Constraints on State and Local Taxation of Energy
Resources, 31 NAT'L TAX J. 245, 246 (1978).

19. Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., supra note 14, at 259.
20. Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199 (1961) relied heavily upon Oliver Iron Mining Co. v.
Lord, supra note 17.
21- See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).

22. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, supra note 15, at 254 (citations omitted).
23. Id. at 255-56.

24. Id. at 259.
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In Spector a Missouri tax on the privilege of engaging in
exclusively interstate commerce (trucking) was challenged. 25

The tax was held invalid, even though it was measured by
apportioned net income, because it was based on the privilege
of carrying on exclusively interstate business within the
state.2 6 The Spector rule, as it has been called,2 7 eventually
degenerated into a rule of mere draftsmanship as the Court
came more and more to grips with the economic realities of
28
state taxation of interstate commerce.

The Heisler test allowed states to tax local activities
because they were not yet in interstate commerce. Western
Live Stock, instead of drawing a line between commerce in and
commerce not in interstate commerce, focused on the potential
for double taxation. Spector attempted to distinguish between
taxes on the privilege of doing business, which were unconstitutional, and other taxes with virtually the same
economic effect, which were constitutional. Any tax challenged on Constitutional grounds had to be analyzed under one or
more of these three tests.
In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,2 9 the Supreme

Court took steps to end the confusion which resulted from the
existence of three distinct tests for determining when interstate commerce could be required to pay its fair share of
state taxes. In this case, the Court overruled the Spectorline of

cases and laid down a four-part test which it has consistently
applied.3 0 Citing Western Live Stock with approval, the Court
said it would adhere to those decisions which have "considered
not the formal language of the tax statute but rather its practical effect, and have sustained a tax against Commerce Clause
challenge when the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not
25.
26.
27.
28.

Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, supra note 16, at 603-604.
Id. at 609-10.
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, supra note 12, at 284.
Id. at 284-85. The Spector rule was used to declare a Virginia license tax on the privilege
of doing business unconstitutional. Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359
(1954). A modified tax was upheld after it was rewritten to charge a "franchise tax"
measured by gross receipts, even though the economic effect was the same. Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959).
29. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, supra note 12.
30. See, e.g., Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 445 (1979) (decided on
other grounds); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980); Exxon
Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980); Maryland v. Louisiana,
U.S.
.,101 S.Ct. 2114 (1981) (tax struck down as discriminating against interstate
commerce).
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discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related
to the services provided by the State."' 3' The Court simply
stated this test with no explanation as to how its parts were to
be applied.
The Court's decision in Complete Auto met with the approval of some Constitutional scholars as "a realistic approach
to commerce clause jurisprudence" which "should be encouraged". 3

2

Complete Auto did not, however, deal directly

with the limits on a state's authority to tax mineral
severance. 33 About one year after the Complete Auto decision,
Commonwealth Edison and its fourteen co-plaintiffs 34 filed
their challenge to the Montana coal severance tax as an impermissible burden on interstate commerce under the Complete
Auto test.
THE MONTANA SEVERANCE TAX CASE

A. The Supreme Court's Reasoning
The Supreme Court received Commonwealth Edison's appeal from the Montana Supreme Court with a minimal record
to review. The trial court had granted the State of Montana's
motion to dismiss. The Montana high court, relying on Heisler,
had held the tax immune from commerce clause scrutiny,
characterizing the severance of coal as a local activity which
occurs before the coal enters into interstate commerce. 35 The
Montana Court also noted that, even if the Complete Auto test
31. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, supra note 12, at 279.
32. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 345 (1978).

33. Complete Auto dealt with a state income tax as it applied to a trucking firm which
delivered new automobiles from the railhead to individual auto dealers.
34. The other plaintiffs-appellants are Central 111.Light Co., Dairyland Power Coop., Detroit
Edison Co., Interstate Power Co., Lake Superior District Power Co., Lower Colo. River
Authority/City of Austin, Minnesota Power & Light Co., Northern States Power Co., Upper Peninsula Generating Co., Wisconsin Power & Light Co., Decker Coal Co., Peabody
Coal Co., Westmoreland Resources, Inc., and Western Energy Co.
35. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, supra note 5, at 854. The Heisler line of cases
had not been specifically overruled and, although it was criticized by legal scholars,
Hellerstein, supra note 18, at 248; Developments in the Law: Federal Limitations on
State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HARV. L. REV. 953, 967-68 (1962) (hereinafter
cited as Developments]; Comment, supranote 11, at 905-906, state courts continued to rely on Heisler even after Complete Auto was decided. Post Oak Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Tax
Comm'r, 575 P.2d 964, 967-68 Okla. 1978) (citing Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, supra
note 17); Miami Copper Co. Div., Tenn. Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 121 Ariz. App. 150.
589 P.2d 24, 28-29 (1978), cert. denied,441 U.S. 932 (1979) (citing Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., supra note 14); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, supra note 5, at 854.
The Tenth Circuit also relied on these cases in Merrion v Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d
537, 545 (10th Cir. 1980), U.S. decision pending, No. 80-11 (scheduled for reargument,
July 2, 1981).
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did apply to the coal severance tax, the "plaintiffs could not
prevail as a matter of law". 36
The Montana Court summarily disposed of the first three
prongs of the Complete Auto test.17 Focusing on the "fairly
related" portion of the test,38 the Montana Court found that
"[i]t is only when the taxpayer has an insufficient nexus to the
taxing state [first prong], or the tax is disproportionate to the
incidents of commerce being taxed [second prong], that the
fair-relation test [fourth prong] applies." 3 9 According to the
Montana Supreme Court, the severance tax could be upheld
under either the Heisler rule or under the Complete Auto test.
On review, the United States Supreme Court held that a
state severance tax is subject to scrutiny under the Commerce
Clause and "disapproved" of any "contrary statements in
Heisler and its progeny". 40 The Court then proceeded to apply
the Complete Auto test, observing that the "Appellants [did]
not dispute that the Montana tax satisfies the first two
prongs" of the test . 4 1 The only possible site of severance of the
coal is in Montana so the nexus requirement is met; the apportionment requirement is met because the severance of coal
could only occur in Montana, making multiple taxation of the
severance impossible.
In applying the third prong of the Complete Auto test, the
Court addressed the Appellants' contention that, since the tax
burden is borne primarily by out-of-state consumers, it
discriminates against interstate commerce. 42 The Supreme
Court held that, because the "tax burden is borne according to
the amount of coal consumed and not according to any distinction between in-state and out-of-state consumers" it does not
discriminate against interstate commerce.'3
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, supra note 5, at 855.
Id.
See text accompanying note 31 supra.
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, supra note 5, at 856.
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, supra note 13, at 2953. The Court also noted that
it did not mean to "suggest, however, that Heisler and its progeny were wrongly
decided." Id. at 2953, n.7. Presumably the Court meant that the Heisler opinion had
reached a proper result in upholding the Pennsylvania coal tax.
41. Id. at 2954.
42. Appellants argued that since 90% of the coal mined in Montana is shipped out-of-state,
consumers in other states bear an unfair proportion of Montana's tax burden. Brief of Ap36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

pellants, supra note 2, at 33-34.

43. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, supra note 13, at 2954.
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The Court also rejected the Appellants' offer to prove that
the tax did not meet the fourth prong of the CompleteAuto test
in that the amount of the tax is not "fairly related to the services provided by the State." 44 The Court said that the
Appellants' argument on this issue rested on the invalid
premise that the amount of the tax must be fairly related to
either the additional costs the State incurs because of coal mining or to the actual value of State services provided to the coal
industry. 45
Noting that the fourth prong of the Complete Auto test is
"closely connected" with the first prong (nexus), the Court
said that the fourth prong "imposes the additional limitation
that the measure of the tax must be reasonably related to the
extent of the contact [with the taxing state], since it is the activities or presence of the taxpayer in the State that may pro46
perly be made to bear a 'just share of the state tax burden'.."
The Court held finally that, since it is measured as a percentax
tage of the value of the coal taken, the Montana severance
47
satisfies the fourth prong of the Complete Auto test.
B. The Complete Auto Test Applied
The nexus requirement of the first prong of the Complete
Auto test is similar to the "minimum contacts" requirement
for the exercise of state court jurisdiction over nonresidents. 48
It is a sort of "jurisdiction to tax" standard. This standard appears to be quite loose in modern cases. In Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Commissionerof Taxes49 the Court held that the nexus requirement is met if the taxpayer does business within the state. 50
44. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, supra note 12, at 279.
45. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, supra note 13, at 2955-56. The Appellants had
conceded that some degree of tax on coal severance was permissible and had offered to
show that a reasonable tax rate would be 20 per ton, rather than the approximately $2.00
per ton raised by the 30% tax. Brief of Appellants, supranote 2, at 12.
46. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, supra note 13, at 2958 (citations omitted) (em.
phasis in original).
47. Id.

48. TRIBE, supra note 32, at 347-48.
49. 445 U.S. 425 (1980).

50. Id. at 437. Accord, Japan Lines, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, supranote 30, at 445; Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, supra note 30, at 220. See also Connecticut
Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 80 (1937), where the Court said it would "look
to the state power to control the objects of the tax as marking the boundaries of the
power to lay' the tax. The ConnecticutGen. Life Ins. Co. case declared a California tax on
the proceeds of reinsurance policies issued in Connecticut to California insurance companies invalid under the Due Process Clause because there was no relationship between
the transactions taxed and the taxing state.
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There was really no issue as to the application of the nexus
requirement in Commonwealth Edison v. Montana. Montana
taxed the severance of coal in Montana. " '[T]here can be no
argument here that a substantial, in fact, the51 only nexus of
severance of coal is established in Montana'."
The second requirement, that a tax be fairly apportioned,
was not new to Complete Auto. The Court had approved state
taxes based on a percentage of the gross income of corporations involved in interstate commerce where the state made
some attempt to approximate the portion of corporate income
reasonably related to activities within the taxing state.52 The
Court's main aim in requiring fair apportionment is to protect
interstate commerce from the possibility of mutliple taxation
by the imposition of taxes which were "capable, in point of
substance, of being imposed ... with equal right by every state
which the commerce touches, merely because interstate commerce is being done."13 The cumulative burden of unapportioned taxes would surely impede interstate commerce by subjecting it to a greater tax burden than that levied on strictly
intrastate businesses. The Montana coal severance tax is, by
definition, incapable of being repeated in any other state. Coal
can be severed only once and only Montana can tax that
severance when it happens in Montana.
The Court's analysis of apportioned taxes is not without
flaw given its goal of avoiding multiple taxation. Even though
the severance of Montana coal can be taxed only by Montana,
the tax is measured as a percentage of contract sales price.
Those coal producers which do business in more than one state
are nevertheless subject to income taxes on their total gross
revenues in any state in which they do business. Even the use
of some sort of apportioned tax designed to tax only that portion of income reasonably related to business conducted within
the state does not guarantee that multi-state operations will
not be taxed more than once on the same income, resulting in a
sort of double taxation. A great deal depends on the apportionment formulas used by the individual states to determine the
tax liability of the taxpayer. 54
51. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, supra note 13, at 2954 (quoting Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Montana, supra note 5, at 855).
52. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, supra note 15, at 255-56.
53. Id.
54. A survey published in 1960 found that 14% of the responding companies paid taxes on
more tot income than they actually earned because of the operation of the state apportionment formulas. Developments, supra note 35, at 966 n.67 (citing CONTROLLERS INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, A DECADE OF PROGRESS REGARDING MULTIPLE TAXATION ON INCOME FROM INTERSTATE COMMERCE 27 (1960)).
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The Court's recent decision in Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin
Department of Revenue, 55 while purporting to examine the
practical effect of an apportioned income tax under the Complete Auto test, held that in the case of an "integrated
business" the taxpayer must show that its "functional departments" are so separate from any activity within the taxing
state that they form "discrete business enterprises". 6 Exxon
attempted to show by a separate internal accounting procedure that income from its exploration and production operations should not be taxed in Wisconsin because only marketing
operations were conducted in Wisconsin. The Supreme Court
held that, even though Exxon only marketed and did not explore for or produce petroleum products within Wisconsin, the
all
State could apply its apportionment formula to income from
57
liability.
tax
state
Exxon's
determine
to
three operations
It would appear that the Court has not successfully dealt
with the economic consequences of allowing any state in which
a multi-state corporation does business tax according to its
particular apportionment formula. As long as a corporation
has a unified management function, any state in which it does
business can tax a proportion of its entire income, whether or
not that income is obtained from operations in the taxing state.
A coal company which operates in Montana and other states,
for example, must pay 30% of the contract sales price of coal
mined in Montana to the State of Montana in severance tax.
The same income from the same sales contracts is also taxable
as income in any other state in which the company does
business so long as the state uses some sort of apportionment
formula.
The Supreme Court's analysis of the third prong of the
Complete Auto test-the requirement that the tax not
discriminate against interstate commerce-is consistent with
the first step of its analysis of state regulatory measures which
affect interstate commerce. The Court, having determined
that the tax is neutral on its face, made no further inquiry into
the actual operation of the tax. After declaring its intention to
55. Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Department of Revenue, supra note 30.
56. Id. at 224.

57. Id. Accord, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, supra note 30. The Court reasoned
in both cases that the separate internal accounting of income did not necessarily take into
account the money saved by the unified management and purchasing functions of an integrated business.
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examine "the practical effect of a challenged tax", the Court
stopped short of doing so.58 The dissenters argued that the
analysis should go beyond the wording of the statute, and consider whether the tax actually burdens or interferes with in59
terstate commerce.
The Appellants had argued that Montana and other
western states are attempting to exploit their "monopoly" on
low-sulphur coal by exporting their tax burden out of state, 60 in
violation of the free trade principles embodied in the Commerce Clause. 61 The factual questions involved in determining
whether the Montana tax actually operates to impose a barrier
to free trade are monumental. The threshold question might
be, "Is the state actually in a position, because of a monopoly
on low-sulphur coal, to impede the free flow of interstate commerce, or will coal consumers merely go elsewhere if Montana
taxes get too high?" The next question might be, "Does the
30% tax rate actually operate to restrict out-of-state consumption?"61 2 The Court itself recognized this type of analysis poses
difficult evidentiary questions which might render the Court's
search for answers "futile". 83
The Supreme Court has looked to the practical operation
of a facially neutral state tax in at least one earlier case. In
Nippert v. City of Richmond,64 the Court held that an annual
city license fee imposed on solicitors was a burden on interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause
because it unduly burdened interstate businesses. The Court
then looked behind the wording of the ordinance to the operation of the tax and found that, even though it was facially
neutral, it operated to exclude small out-of-state operators
who could not afford the cumulative burden of license taxes.65
The decision in Commonwealth Edison v. Montana seems
to indicate the Court's unwillingness to involve the judiciary in
58. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, supra note 13, at 2953.
59. Id. at 2968.
60. Id. at 2954-55.
61. Hellerstein, supra note 18, at 249-50.
62. Id. at 248-50. Developments, supra note 35, at 968-70.
63. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, supra note 13, at 2955 n.8.
64. 327 U.S. 416 (1945).
65. Id. at 428. The Court has gone beyond the mere wording of a facially neutral statute in
cases where a state is regulating, as opposed to taxing, interstate business. See, e.g., Bibb
v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434
U.S. 429 (1978)
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the complex factual questions involved in determining the
economic operation of various, often conflicting, state taxes.
This unwillingness is also reflected in the Court's analysis of
the fourth prong of the Complete Auto test-the requirement
that the tax be fairly related to the services provided by the
state.
The Appellants insisted that the fourth prong of the Complete Auto test contemplates a factual determination by the
trial court that the rate of the Montana severance tax was or
was not fairly related to the services provided by the state.
They claimed that if the only measure of services referred to in
the fourth prong of the test is the provision of the "advantages
of a civilized society", the "test has no real meaning because it
can be met by any state and under all circumstances. ' 6 6 The
majority found that the benefits of a civilized society were indeed all the Appellants or any other taxpayer could ask from a
state and that "[b]ecause it is measured as a percentage of the
value of the coal taken, the Montana tax is in 'proper proportion' to appellants' activities within the State and, therefore,
to their 'consequent enjoyment of the opportunities and protections which the state has afforded' in connection with those
activities".67
As the dissent aptly points out, the majority's interpretation of the fairly related test is a return to the mechanical approach of Heisler even though the Court had rejected such an
approach in Complete Auto. 68 The fourth prong also becomes a
rule of drafting similar to the rejected Spector rule: States are
free to impose whatever severance tax they wish, free from
Commerce Clause scrutiny, so long as they impose a proportional, rather than a flat rate, tax.
The Supreme Court held that a determination of the level
or rate of taxation is a matter for legislative, and not judicial,
determination. 9 Given the extensive economic analysis required to make even an approximate judgment as to what is a
"fair relation" between tax rates, tax revenues, and services
provided, and given the policy considerations inherent in any
66.
67.
68.
69.

Brief of Appellants, supra note 2, at 29-30.
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, supra note 13, at 2958-59.
Id. at 2968.
Id. at 2959.
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such analysis, the Court is probably correct in seeing this as a
question for the legislature. The Court's rationale here is also
consistent with earlier decisions which, when asking whether a
state has given anything to interstate commerce for which it
can ask return, refer to the "substantial privilege" of carrying
on business within the state without discussing the specific services provided by the state to the taxpayer. 0 As the majority
correctly points out, a taxpayer has never been able to successfully challenge the rate of a tax because she is not benefit7
ted in an amount equal to the amount of the tax. '
Commonwealth Edison v.
Montana DECISION
The Montana severance tax, coming as it did in the wake of
the 1973 Arab oil embargo and the rather frantic search for
homegrown sources of energy, has not been popular, especially
with coal consumers. The utility and coal producer plaintiffs
were supported by six amicus briefs in the Supreme Court,
mostly representing coal-consuming states .72
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE

The unpopularity of the severance tax among Montana's
sister states is particularly important in light of the Supreme
Court's clearly extended invitation to Congress to legislate a
ceiling on severance tax rates.73 As the Court noted in its opinion, the idea of a severance tax ceiling received some atten74
tion from the 96th Congress before this case was decided.
There are currently two bills pending before the 97th Congress
to amend the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of
197875 to limit the permissible rate of severance taxes. Senate
70. Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney, 311 U.S. 435, 444-45 (1940).
71. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, supra note 13 (citing Carmichael v. Southern
Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937)). Applying Carmichael, 301 U.S. at 521, there need
not be a relation between the subject of the tax (here, severance of coal in Montana) and
the evil to be met by the apportionment of the tax (whether the tax is to raise revenues
for general governmental support or to alleviate the impact of coal development).
72. Amicus briefs were submitted by the State of Texas; the Crow Tribe of Indians; several
midwestern and northeastern Congressmen; the States of New Jersey and Michigan; the
States of Minnesota, Iowa, Wisconsin; and the State of Kansas on behalf of the appellant
corporations. Amicus briefs were submitted by the members of the Wyoming congressional delegation; the States of North Dakota and West Virginia; the Environmental
Defense Fund, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and the Sierra Club; the State of
New Mexico; several western Congressmen; the Western Governors' Policy Office; the
Western Conference of Council of State Governments; and the States of Wyoming, Colorado, Nevada, Idaho, Washington, and Oregon on behalf of the State of Montana. The
Solicitor General of the United States also submitted a brief arguing that the tax should
be upheld.
73. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, supra note 13, at 2959.
74. Id. n.18.
75. 42 U.S.C. S 8301(bX3) (Supp. III 1979).
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bill S. 17876 proposes to limit "the sum of all severance taxes,
or fees, in respect of any fiscal year, imposed by a State or
political subdivision" of a state to 121/2% of the value of coal
mined "from Indian lands or lands owned by the Federal
Government which is destined for shipment in interstate commerce". The House version of the bill, H.R. 1313," not limited
to coal mined on Indian or Federal lands, also includes a 121/2%
of value limit on severance taxes or fees. Both bills are now in
committee.
If Congress acts in response to the Court's invitation to
pass a ceiling on severance taxes, the validity of such a ceiling
will certainly be questioned. The Commonwealth Edison v.
Montana decision also has ramifications for the future of state
taxes in general.
A. Congress' ConstitutionalAuthority to Limit the Rate of
State Severance Taxes
The Court seems to find Congress' authority to limit the
rate at which states may tax the severance of minerals in the
Supremacy Clause and in those other provisions of the Constitution which reserve particular powers to the national
government, notably the Commerce Clause. Any Congressional limit on the maximum level of state severance taxes
must, however, be in the form of an "explicit directive from
Congress" because "[c]oncurrent federal and state taxation"
78
is the accepted norm.
Congress has enacted at least one statute which does limit
the right of states to tax interstate business. 79 This statute
prohibits states from taxing the net income of foreign corporations whose only business within the state is the solicitation of
orders to be filled elsewhere. The State of Louisiana challenged the constitutionality of this statute in InternationalShoe
Co. v. Cocreham in 1964.80 The Louisiana Supreme Court
upheld the prohibition on state taxes, relying on the Commerce
and Supremacy Clauses of the Constitution. 8 ' The U.S.
76. S. 178, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
77. H.R. 1313, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
78. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, supra note 30, at 448.

79. 15 U.S.C. SS 381-384 (1976). See also 15 U.S.C. S 391 (1976) prohibiting states from levying taxes which discriminate against out-of-state consumers of electricity, either directly
or indirectly.
80. 246 La. 244, 164 So. 2d 314 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 902 (1964).

81. Id. at 164 So. 2d at 318, 320-21.
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Supreme Court denied certiorari and let the state court's
82
decision stand.
The significant distinction between the statute upheld in
InternationalShoe and one limiting state taxes on mineral
severance appears to be that Congress, having found that
state taxes burdened an industry which was exclusively involved in interstate commerce, chose to prohibit taxing of those
businesses in this particular instance. Mineral severance would
be exclusively interstate commerce only if none of the minerals
were consumed in the state where mined. To the extent that
the minerals are consumed within the state, they would
theoretically not be in interstate commerce and perhaps not
subject to Congressional limits on severance taxes.
The distinction between minerals consumed within and
without the state where they are mined is probably not important to the determination of whether or not Congress can limit
state severance taxes. The Supreme Court has approved the
extension of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce
to even what would appear to be the most "local" of activities
on the grounds that they affect the interstate market.8 3 The
Court is likely to sustain some Congressional limit on state
severance taxes, whether applied to coal consumed in or out of
the state, on Commerce Clause grounds.
A federal statute which prohibits states from levying
discriminatory taxes on the generation or transmission of electricity for out-of-state consumption 84 was upheld on
Supremacy and Commerce Clause grounds in Arizona Public
Service Commission v. Snead.85 The Arizona Public Service
Commission challenged a New Mexico tax on the generation of
electricity as discriminatory and, therefore, in violation of the
federal statute because New Mexico utilities were allowed to
off-set the 2% generation tax by an equal credit against the
New Mexico retail sales tax when the electricity was sold for
consumption in New Mexico.8 6
82. See note 80 supra.

83. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, supra note 21, where the production of small quantities of
grain for home use was held to affect interstate commerce and be, therefore, within the
power of Congress to regulate.
84. 15 U.S.C. S 391 (1976).
85. 441 U.S. 141 (1979).

86. Id. at 144-45. Out-of-state purchasers were guaranteed no such sales tax set-off.
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The Court's application of the Supremacy Clause pointed
to a legislative history which showed that Congress had passed
this Act with the New Mexico tax in mind.8 7 The Court declined to look at the entire tax structure of the state of New Mexico and instead looked "not only to the language of that
[federal] statute but also to the expressed intent of Congress
itself in enacting it".s8 Finding that Congress had a "rational
basis" to believe that the New Mexico tax interfered with interstate commerce and that Congress had selected a
reasonable means to eliminate that perceived interference, the
Court upheld the federal statute as within the permissible
bounds of Congress' authority to regulate interstate
commerce.8 9
This opinion, in dictum, noted that Congress had not attempted to prevent New Mexico from taxing electrical generation to help pay for environmental and other problems caused
by the generating facilities in New Mexico. Congress merely
sought to end tax discrimination against out-of-state
consumers.
The value of Arizona PublicService Commission as an indication of how the Court might resolve a state challenge to a
Congressional limitation on coal severance taxes is two-fold:
first, it sets forth the test the Court will apply to determine
when Congress can override state taxes by federal statute;
and, secondly, it hints that there may be limits to Congress'
authority to eliminate or limit state taxes.
The test of the constitutionality of Congress' exercise of its
Commerce Clause authority vis-a-vis state taxes is not a difficult one for Congress to meet. If Congress has a rational
basis for determining that the tax interferes with interstate
commerce and uses a reasonable method to eliminate this interference, the Court will uphold the limitation.90 Note that the
standard does not require Congress to find that the tax
discriminates against interstate commerce. This standard differs in that regard from the Complete Auto test by which
courts will evaluate state taxes.
87. Id. at 147-48.
88. Id. at 149-50.

89. Id. at 150.
90. Id.
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In Arizona Public Service Commission, the Court also
limited its review of Congress' determination that the tax interfered with interstate commerce to the legislative history of
the federal statute and refused to look to the entire tax structure of the state to make an independent judgment as to the
operation of the tax.9 1The Court apparently has determined to
accord great deference to Congress in its efforts to limit state
taxes in light of the potentially significant impact state taxes
can have on interstate commerce.
Each of the two bills to limit severance taxes on coal which
are currently before the 97th Congress cites enhancing interstate commerce as one of its purposes. Arizona PublicService Commission indicates that the Supreme Court will defer
to Congress' decisions as to whether or not state taxes interfere with interstate commerce. The Court can easily rely on
the language of either of these bills, if passed, to find Congress' view that any severance tax over the rate of 12'/2% does
interfere with interstate commerce. Finding such a legislative
determination might well end the Court's inquiry, except
perhaps to note that a limitation on tax rates is a reasonable
way for Congress to eliminate the burden on commerce.
Deference to a Congressional determination in setting a
tax ceiling is consistent with the Court's opinion in Commonwealth Edison v. Montana.92 The Court recognized in that
opinion that the amount of a tax is a question for legislative
determination, even at the national level, if Congress thinks
93
that particular state taxes are contrary to national interests.
In summary, it appears that a federal ceiling on state coal
severance taxes will not receive strict scrutiny by the federal
courts. The courts will look to the language of the federal limit
and to its legislative history to see if Congress perceived the
particular state tax as a burden on interstate commerce. If
Congress had a rational basis for its belief that the tax was a
burden and used a reasonable means to eliminate the burden,
the tax ceiling will stand.
91. Id. at 149.
92. See note 13 supra.

93. Id. at 2959. Both H.R. 1313 and S. 178 also state that the proposed limit on state
severance taxes is required to "alleviate the national energy emergency [and to] reduce
national dependence on petroleum imports", as well as to enhance interstate commerce.
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The possible limits on Congress' authority to prohibit a
particular state tax altogether are alluded to in dictum at the
end of the Arizona Public Service Commission decision. The
Court notes that "[tlhere is no indication that Congress intended to prevent the State from taxing the generation of electricity to pay for solutions to [environmental and other]
problems". 9 4 If Congress were to place an outright prohibition
on severance taxes or to place an unreasonably low ceiling on
them, the states could argue persuasively that Congress was,
in effect, interfering with a function essential to the state's
separate and independent existence.
Applying the Court's earlier decision in NationalLeague of
Cities v. Usery,95 an absolute prohibition on state severance
taxes could be attacked as an unconstitutional Congressional
attempt to impair an essential attribute of state
sovereignty-the power to tax.96 Unlike the federal statute in
question in National League of Cities,97 an absolute ban on
state severance taxes would not impose additional costs on
states, except to the extent that it would deprive them of a
significant source of tax revenues. 98 It would, however,
drastically curtail state activity directed to alleviating the impact of mineral development by eliminating such a significant
source of revenue.
A total ban on mineral severance taxes seems too extreme for Congress to even consider. A much more likely issue
is the question of how low a ceiling Congress can enact before
the Court would overrule it under National League of Cities.
Both bills pending before Congress now propose a ceiling of
121/2%. The Court would have to strike some sort of balance
between Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce and
the State's power to exercise its sovereignty through taxing.
To strike this balance, the Court would once more be placed in
Arizona Public Service Comm'n v. Snead, supra note 85, at 150-51.
426 U.S. 833 (1976).
Id. at 845.
In NationalLeague of Cities, the Court declared unconstitutional a federal statute which
extended the minimum wage and maximum hours provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 29 U.S.C. S 203 (1976), to the employees of states and their political subdivisions.
98. Montana collected over $5.4 million in severance taxes from the Appellants in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana alone between 1975 and 1978. Some estimates say
that the State of Montana will receive severance tax revenues on all minerals of about
$80 million in 1981 and $128.7 million by 1983. Wyoming is expected to receive about
$137.9 million in 1981 and $549.1 million by 1985. Whipple, Severance Taxes, High Country News, July 10, 1981, at 10, col. 1.
94.
95.
96.
97.
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the position it tried to avoid in Commonwealth Edison v. Montana:that of evaluating the rate at which a state should be able
to tax coal severance.
B. State Taxes in General after Commonwealth Edison v.
Montana
The Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth Edison v.
Montana has implications for general state revenue taxes. 99
Several of these implications seem clear:
-The state's authority to tax extends even to enterprises which are engaged wholly in interstate
business100
-State legislatures should draft taxing statutes to levy
a proportional, rather than a flat rate tax, on revenues
to meet the "fairly related" test. 10 1 This portion of the
Complete Auto test has thus become a combination of
the "nexus" test and a requirement that the tax be proportional to revenue raised from the activity which provides the taxing state with a nexus.
-State taxes must also be drafted so that they do not
discriminate against interstate commerce on their face.
A facially neutral tax will not receive strict scrutiny to
determine whether its real economic effect
is to burden
102 or interfere with interstate commerce.
The Court now has one test for reviewing state taxes: the
Complete Auto test. Heisler,with its distinctions between commerce which is in and commerce which is out ofthe stream of
interstate commerce, is officially dead.
After Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, challenge to
state taxes may be easily adjudicated before trial so long as the
99. The court was careful to distinguish user fees or taxes from general revenue taxes, thus
preserving an earlier line of cases which required that the fees charged by a state be proportionate to the services rendered. The Court seems to believe that user taxes are different from ordinary tax measures in that they are related to and based on specific services provided by the state to the taxpayer and, therefore, are more readily evaluated in
quantitative terms. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, supra note 13, at 2956.
100. See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, supra note 12.
101. See text accompanying notes 66-69 supra.
102. Compare the treatment of state taxes in Commonwealth Edison with that in Maryland v.
Louisiana, supra note 30, and Arizona Public Service Comm'n v. Snead, supra note 85.
Taxes perceived as discriminatory on their face because of tax breaks to local users may
be per se unconstitutional.
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tax law is drafted in compliance with Complete Auto and Commonwealth Edison in mind. The "nexus" portion of the test
may pose the only real factual problems. The trial court might
need to take evidence to determine, in questionable cases, if
the taxpayer has minimum contacts or is doing business within
the state. 03
The fair apportionment requirement of the test will ordinarily be a question of fact only if the tax in question is
capable of being imposed equally by all states which the taxed
commerce touches. Mere speculation will not be enough; the
taxpayer will have to allege a specific instance of multiple taxation. 104 If a state tax, like the Montana severance tax, is
measured by the income received from activities conducted
within the taxing state, apportionment poses no factual
questions. 05
CONCLUSION

Montana's 30% severance tax was upheld in the face of
Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause challenges in Commonwealth Edison v. Montana. The Heisler test was laid to
rest and the Complete Auto test was reaffirmed. Challenged
state tax measures will be reviewed to see if they meet the
four-part Complete Auto test. That test does not place stringent limits on state tax laws so long as they meet the requirement that the tax be proportional.
While Montana has certainly won this round in the fight to
retain its right to tax mineral resources, the Court's decision
recognizes that the fight is not over. The next, and potentially
more difficult, task facing coal-producing states is to prevent
this victory from being taken away by Congressional action.
CHRISTINE CHUTE

103. See text accompanying notes 50-53 supra.
104. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, supra note 30.
105. See text accompanying notes 54-59 supra.
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